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T C L S
The Coase Lecture Series, established in honor of Ronald H.
Coase, Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Economics at
the University of Chicago Law School, is intended to provide
law students and others with an introduction to important
techniques and results in law and economics. The lectures presuppose no background in the subject.

F  C
Richard Craswell‡
Talking about freedom of contract is tricky, because the topic
carries a heavy ideological charge. Depending on one’s point of view,
freedom of contract can be seen as a choice between individual liberty and heavy-handed government control, or between communitarian consensus and the worst excesses of laissez-faire capitalism. In
other words, freedom of contract is a sort of lightning rod, which
always attracts strongly-held political beliefs.
In fact, freedom of contract is such a charged topic that I have
to start with a disclaimer, and point out that most of what we know
as contract law has very little to do with freedom of contract as such.
Most of contract law consists of default rules, or rules that apply
when parties fail to address a topic one way or the other in their
contracts. For example, most of the rules governing offer and acceptance, or implied warranties, or implied excuses such as impracticability or mistake, apply only if the parties have not agreed otherwise.
And as long as the parties are free to agree otherwise, it is hard to see
how freedom of contract is at all affected by these default rules.
There are lots of other arguments that might bear on the desirability
of any particular default rule, but arguments about ‘freedom of contract’ are largely irrelevant.1
There are some parts of contract law, though, that do raise freedom of contract issues. The rules against excessive liquidated damage
clauses, for example, or the rules blocking enforcement of promises
‡ Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This paper was prepared for
the Ronald H. Coase Lecture at the University of Chicago Law School on
December , . I am grateful for financial support from the Harry and
Lynde Bradley Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation, and the Sarah
Scaife Foundation.
1 For discussions of possible bases for choosing default rules, see Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: A n
Economic Theory of Default Rules,  Yale L.J.  (); Richard Craswell,
Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,  Mich. L.
Rev.  (); Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent,  S.
Cal. Interdisc. L.J.  ().
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unsupported by consideration, both limit the freedom of contracting
parties to some extent. The same is true, in at least some cases, when
enforcement of harsh contract terms is deemed unconscionable by
courts. And outside of contract law itself, limits on freedom of contract can also be found in insurance law, labor law, landlord-tenant
law, products liability law, and in many other doctrinal fields.
Since this is supposed to be a short lecture, I’m going to set aside
some of the relatively uncontroversial doctrines like fraud and duress.
It’s not that these doctrines are uninteresting, from either an economic or a philosophic point of view. Indeed, as many writers have
discovered, it’s not at all easy to explain just why a contract induced
by fraud or duress should not be enforced.2 Still, most people would
agree that no one should be held to a contract that was signed at the
point of a gun, or a contract signed as a result of fraud. Most people
would also agree that there may be a case for limiting contract terms
that create externalities, or effects on people who aren’t parties to the
contract.3 Since I don’t want to talk about things that everybody
agrees on, I’m going to focus instead on some of the more controversial limits on the enforceability of contract terms.
To give us some examples, think about a clause that gives a creditor the right to repossess all of the debtor’s furniture if the debtor
misses a payment,4 or a clause that releases a manufacturer from all
liability—including liability for physical injury—if its product turns
out to be defective.5 These are the kind of clauses that are often
challenged under the contract-law doctrine of unconscionability.
My topic is, what can economics tell us about when clauses like
these ought to be restricted?
2 For a survey of some possible arguments, see Anthony T. Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts,  Yale L.J.  (); Michael J.
Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract chs. - (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, ).
3 For discussions of this issue see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why
Restrain Alienation?  Colum. L. Rev.  (); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,  Colum. L. Rev.  ().
4 E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,  2d  (D.C.
Cir. ).
5 E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,  ..,  .d 
().
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At this point, though, I have to make another disclaimer. The
question that economics tries to answer is whether clauses like these
are efficient or not. In other words, economics has nothing directly
to say about whether these clauses are fair, or just, or whether buyer’s
freedoms have been infringed. There are of course political and
moral theories which speak to those questions, and I think economics does have something to contribute to these theories. In this
lecture, though, I’m going to be speaking primarily about questions
of efficiency. In other words, we can rephrase the question I’m addressing here as, ‘When can legal restrictions on contract clauses be
efficient?’
I. A     
To answer this question, let me start with a story in which restrictions on contract clauses would never be efficient. (If this were a
technical economic paper, what I’m about to say would be called a
model—but since this is a nonmathematical lecture, you can think of
it as a story.) The moral of this story is that if the market is working
perfectly, there should never be any inefficient contract terms, so efficiency can never be improved by forbidding certain terms. I’m not
going to end my analysis with this story—but it does make for a
convenient starting point, if only by way of illustration.
Suppose, then that we have a market that’s highly competitive,
in the sense that there are lots of sellers competing for buyers’ business. Even more important, suppose buyers in this market are perfectly informed about what they are buying. By this, I mean not
only that buyers know what kind of product they’re buying, but also
that they know everything there is to know about the risks they
have to bear, given the contracts that sellers use. For example, if one
seller’s contract limits the seller’s liability for damages caused by a
defective product, buyers not only know that they have to bear that
risk, they also know just how likely a defective product is, and just
how much damage a defective product is likely to do. This is an extreme assumption, in some ways—but, as I said, it’s useful to start
with an extreme case to use as a benchmark.
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A. The Efficiency of Perfect Markets
In this market, economists would claim, any contract clause
which survives very long must be an efficient one. Efficiency, in this
context, is defined in cost-benefit terms: A clause is inefficient if the
harms it inflicts on buyers are greater than the savings it creates for
sellers. There are of course difficulties in how we measure these
harms, and how we compare the harm to buyers against the benefits
to sellers—but it will be easier to talk about these difficulties later,
after I’ve finished this story. Let me focus first on the claim this
story attempts to illustrate: the claim that, in a market such as this,
the only clauses that survive will be the ones whose net benefits are
positive. If this claim is right, it follows that prohibiting those
clauses could only reduce efficiency, by getting rid of clauses whose
net benefits were positive.
Why would only efficient clauses survive in this market? If
buyers in this market know exactly what risks a clause imposes on
them, any seller can make her product more attractive by getting rid
of terms that impose risks on buyers.6 Of course, the seller will lose
something by getting rid of those terms: she’ll lose whatever benefits
the terms gave her. If a seller gets rid of the limitations on her warranty, for example, her product will then be more attractive to buyers, but the seller’s own costs will go up because she’ll have to pay
more warranty claims. Still, the seller can make up for her own
higher costs by raising the product’s price to cover her costs. And
here’s the key: if buyers know exactly what risks the seller’s contract
does or does not impose, the higher price won’t necessarily scare
buyers away. Instead, buyers will be more attracted to the product
(on balance) whenever the higher price is outweighed by the better
contract terms they’re now getting. Conversely, buyers will be less
attracted to the product whenever the better contract terms are not
enough to outweigh the higher price. And that’s exactly what we
want to happen, from an efficiency point of view.7
6 For convenience in the use of pronouns, all of my examples involve female sellers and male buyers.
7 The fact that the sellers’ costs can be passed on to buyers in the form of a
higher price also eliminates some of the difficulties involved in comparing
gains to buyers and costs to sellers. For a more complete discussion of this
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Another way to put this point is to think of the risks that a
product imposes as just one more element of the product’s total
price. By ‘total price,’ I mean not just the monetary price the buyer
has to pay, but also the expected costs of all the risks the buyer has to
assume. If getting rid of a particular clause will make the total price
go down, from the buyer’s point of view, that will make the product
more attractive to the buyer, and sellers in a competitive market will
have an incentive to get rid of that clause in order to make their
products more attractive. But if getting rid of that clause will make
the total price go down, this means that the benefits to the buyer
must exceed the costs to the seller (i.e., the costs reflected in the
higher monetary price), so getting rid of that clause must also be efficient. This is why, in markets where buyers are perfectly informed,
the only clauses which survive should be those that are efficient.
II. M 
In a perfect market like this, then, there would never be an efficiency case for any restrictions on freedom of contract. Indeed, if all
markets were this perfect, economists would have very little to say
about freedom of contract: I could end the lecture right now, and
we could all go home. However, much of economics consists of
studying markets that are not this perfect, and then trying to figure
out which institutions could arise to deal with the imperfections.
Let me talk now about this branch of economics: the branch that
analyzes what are sometimes called market failures. As I’ll use the
term here, a ‘market failure’ is simply anything that prevents a market from operating as perfectly as it did in the scenario I just described.
A. Monopoly
I’m going to spend most of my time talking about market failures that result from imperfect information. First, though, I should
say something about markets where the problem is a monopoly.
Economists have known for a long time that monopolized markets
may not behave as well as markets where there’s lots of competition.
As a result, monopoly is the kind of market failure that’s become
point, see Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency
and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships,  Stan. L. Rev.  ().
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most familiar to laypeople. Indeed, for a long time many courts and
legal scholars assumed that, if inefficient contract terms seemed to
be persisting in certain markets, it must be due to monopoly power.8
Today, though, most economists would not list monopoly
power as a likely source of inefficient contract terms. Moreover, even
in those cases where a monopolist did have an incentive to choose
inefficient contract terms, most economists would not say that prohibiting the inefficient terms would necessarily improve things for
consumers. While I don’t want to spend too much time talking
about monopolized markets, let me give you a brief sketch of the
economic argument.
First, monopolists usually will not have an incentive to choose
inefficient contract terms. The monopolist may have an incentive to
charge a high price, of course, but this does not mean that she’ll also
have an incentive to distort any of the other contract clauses. If
consumers know what the monopolist is doing—an important
qualification that I’ll come back to in a minute—then any attempt
by the monopolist to insert an inefficient term will be seen by consumers as an increase in the ‘total price’ of the product. In other
words, the effect will be much the same as if the monopolist had
not introduced the inefficient clause, but had simply raised the
monetary price of the product by an equivalent amount. But if the
monopolist wants to exploit buyers, she can usually do better by
raising the monetary price of the product, rather than by raising the
‘total price’ by using an inefficient contract term. The problem with
raising the total price indirectly, by using an inefficient contract
term, is that—by definition—an inefficient contract term hurts
buyers by more than it benefits the monopolist. By contrast, a
higher monetary price helps the monopolist by exactly the same
amount that it hurts buyers: the amount of the higher price. This is
why the monopolist will usually be better off exploiting buyers by
8 For example, the link between unfair contract terms and market power
was asserted in an influential article by Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,  Colum. L. Rev.
 (). In Henningsen, supra note , the market power of automobile
manufacturers was put forward as one explanation for the persistence of the
(allegedly) inefficient limitations on the manufacturers’ warranties.
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charging a higher monetary price, rather than by inserting an inefficient contract term.9
Now, I have to add that there are some situations where a monopolist might indeed profit by using certain kinds of inefficient
contract terms. Monopolists can sometimes increase their profits by
dividing their customers into different groups, so that they can
charge each group a different price, and sometimes the introduction
of an inefficient contract term can help sort out the buyers who
would be willing to pay the highest price. Even in these situations,
though, it does not follow that buyers would necessarily be made
better off if the law were to prohibit the inefficient term without
doing anything about the monopoly power. If the law prohibits the
monopolist from using the inefficient term, the monopolist can
simply go back to charging all consumers the same price, and it is
very difficult to define the circumstances under which buyers will be
benefited rather than being hurt by this response.10 Indeed, in some
cases the only way to benefit buyers as a class would be to make the
monopolist adopt a term that was less favorable to buyers than the
term the monopolist would prefer—which might suggest that the
legal system should try to strike down terms that were unduly
9

This issue is analogous to the question, often addressed in the economic
literature, of whether a monopolist will have an incentive to produce a level of
product quality or durability that differs from that produced by a competitive
firm. For a survey of the economic literature on this point, see Richard
Schmalansee, Market Structure, Durability, and Quality: A Selective Survey, 
Econ. Inquiry  (); see also the articles cited infra in note . Discussions
in the legal literature include M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of
Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords,  U.
Tor. L.J.  (); Alan Schwartz, A Re-examination of Nonsubstantive
Unconscionability,  Va. L. Rev. , - (); Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 
Md. L. Rev. , - ().
10 For formal economic models of this problem, see A. Michael Spence,
Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation,  Bell J. Econ.  (); David Besanko,
Shabtai Donnenfeld & Lawrence J. White, Monopoly and Quality Distortion:
Effects and Remedies,  Q.J. Econ.  (); Avery Katz, Your Terms or
Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts,  Rand J. Econ. ,
- ().
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generous to buyers.11 Fortunately, these cases are very difficult to
identify in practice, so no court that I know of has ever felt compelled to try to carry out this theory.
To be sure, there are other arguments that might be made about
a monopolist’s incentives to choose efficient nonprice terms. If the
monopolist is securely protected from competition, she might not
face as much pressure to maximize her own profits, and thus might
not take as much trouble to use efficient terms, even if using efficient terms would be more profitable. On the other hand, a monopolist is not subject to some of the free-rider problems that affect
competitive firms, and this might make it easier for the monopolist
to offer more efficient terms. In short, the theoretical case for being
particularly suspicious of contract terms in monopolized markets is,
at best, weak. Significantly, an empirical study of warranties in monopolized and non-monopolized markets found no appreciable difference between the two.12 This is not to say that the monopolists’
terms were always efficient, of course—just that they were no more
and no less likely to be inefficient than the terms used in competitive
markets.
For now let me return to something I mentioned earlier. I said
that if the monopolist tried to introduce an inefficient contract
term, consumers would perceive that as an increase in the ‘total price’
of the product, if consumers were aware of the inefficient term. If
consumers didn’t realize the monopolist had inserted an inefficient
term—for example, if the inefficient term were hidden in thirty
pages of fine print—then the monopolist might well be able to exploit consumers by using an inefficient contract term. In other
words, it might seem that, when we have a combination of a
11

For example, if a liquidated damage clause exposing the monopolist to
large damage payments would assist the monopolist in sorting its customers,
overall consumer welfare could conceivably be improved if the law required the
monopolist to set a lower limit on her potential damage liability. For formal
models with this characteristic, see Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining
and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules,  Yale L.J. , -
(); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,  Yale L.J. ,  ().
12 George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 
Yale L.J.  ().
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monopoly seller and uninformed buyers, we would then have reason
to worry about inefficient contract terms.
Once we introduce imperfect information into the story, however, the presence of a monopoly becomes largely irrelevant. As I’ll
explain in a minute, if buyers don’t realize what clauses are hidden
away in the fine print, then even markets with lots of competitors
may still generate inefficient contract terms. This is what I’m going
to talk about for most of the rest of the lecture: the market failures
that can arise from imperfect information, regardless of whether the
market is monopolized or has many competing sellers.
In short, I think the focus on monopoly power is really a red
herring where contract terms are concerned. If courts and laypeople
tend to associate inefficient terms with monopolies, it’s probably because monopoly is the only form of market failure that courts and
laypeople are familiar with. The economic analysis of imperfect information came along much more recently in economic
history—most of it in the last twenty years or so—so information
economics hasn’t yet had time to sink into the collective legal
consciousness. But this is where these Coase Lectures come in: One
of the goals here is to introduce lawyers and law students to more
recent developments in economic analysis. With that in mind, let
me now turn to some of the market failures that might arise from
imperfect information. I’ll then talk about the implications that
these market failures might have for the regulation of contract
terms.
B. Imperfect Information
In particular, I want to talk about three distinct kinds of information problems, so I’ll be introducing three more models (or stories). The first two both have to do with imperfect information on
the part of buyers. The third story is more paradoxical: it shows how
terms that are unduly harsh to buyers might also arise if sellers are the
ones who are not perfectly informed.
. Buyer misperception of risks
Let me start, though, with the simplest of these stories. This is
the story that I’ve already alluded to: Suppose buyers simply don’t
know all the risks associated with the products and contracts they
buy. For example, suppose they don’t know that the seller’s contract
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makes buyers bear all the losses if the product turns out to be defective—or suppose that they know they’ll bear all the losses, but they
don’t know how likely it is that any losses will occur (i.e., they don’t
know the defect rate). In other words, in this story buyers are aware
of the monetary price the seller is charging, but they do not correctly
estimate the total price of the product (the monetary price plus the
expected cost of the risks they have to assume).
Obviously, in markets like this there is no guarantee that sellers’
contract terms will be efficient ones. If buyers don’t know enough
to evaluate the total price they’re paying, an inefficient term could
survive simply because buyers didn’t realize how costly the term was
likely to be. In fact, in addition to inefficient contract terms being
provided, buyers might also end up purchasing too much of the
product in question, if they didn’t fully appreciate the risks associated
with the product. To be sure, this problem doesn’t mean that laws
attempting to prohibit inefficient terms will necessarily improve
matters: I’ll return to that issue a little later. Still, in the market I’ve
just described, there’s at least a potential for improvements in efficiency from legal rules banning certain contract terms.
Indeed, this market problem could be analogized to a kind of
fraud, or (at least) to a kind of misrepresentation. That is, the effect
on buyers is the same as if they had been defrauded: buyers end up
with inaccurate beliefs about the purchases they make. To be sure,
common-law fraud required that the seller play an active and
knowing role in creating the buyer’s inaccurate beliefs, and that may
not be the case with the problem I have just described.13 The
13 Of course, the line between affirmatively creating a false belief, on the
one hand, and merely failing to correct an existing false belief, on the other, is
not easy to define. For a discussion of this issue, see Howard Beales, Richard
Craswell & Steven Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information,
 J. Law & Econ. , - (). Indeed, many states now treat the mere
failure to disclose information as actionable (in certain cases), while others
reach similar results by being quite willing to treat silence as an implied representation. Compare, e.g. Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank,  Mass.
,  .. d  () (mere failure to disclose that house was infested by
termites held not actionable), with Kannavos v. Annino,  Mass. , 
..  () (failure to disclose that apartment building was in violation of
local codes was held actionable, because the appearance of the building implicitly represented that it was suitable for use as an apartment house). See gener-
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problem described here could arise simply because buyers are inattentive, or because the cost of reading detailed contracts makes such
close attention inefficient for buyers. Nonetheless, the economic
effect of this problem is very similar to the economic effect of
fraud—and since I said I wasn’t going to say very much about fraud,
I won’t say very much about this problem, either.
. Buyer misperception of changes in risks
My second story involves a more complicated sort of market
failure. In this story, buyers can be perfectly informed about all the
risks associated with the products they actually buy, but they might
not be perfectly informed if any seller were to change the risks associated with her product. In technical terms, buyers might not be
perfectly informed about possible actions off the equilibrium path. If
buyers would not accurately evaluate any change in the level of risks,
sellers might then have no incentive to change their products, and
the market could get stuck in an inefficient equilibrium. Even
though buyers would be accurately informed about all the risks actually created in that equilibrium, no seller will have an incentive to
offer a more favorable level of risks, because buyers would not accurately perceive the significance of the seller’s change.14
Let me make this more concrete. Suppose that buyers are accurately informed about the scope of the average warranty in some
market. Suppose, though, that buyers get this information not from
reading each warranty carefully before they buy, but from their own
personal experiences (or from the experiences of friends) in cases
where they were or were not allowed to collect on the warranty.
Suppose, finally, that this general perception about the scope of the
average warranty is perfectly accurate. That is, suppose that all sellers
do limit their warranties to exactly the extent that buyers expect
them to, meaning that no buyer is misinformed about the extent of
any existing warranty.
ally W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §  (th ed. ).
14 For a formal economic model, see Michael Spence, Consumer
Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability,  Rev. Econ. Stud.
 (). Nontechnical discussions in the legal literature include Victor P.
Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand,  J. Law &
Econ.  (); Kennedy, supra note ,  Md. L. Rev. at -.
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Now consider a seller who is thinking of improving her warranty, to make it a little more generous to buyers. If buyers only have
a general idea about the average warranty offered by all sellers, buyers
might fail to notice if this particular seller improved her warranty.
Moreover, if this seller improves her warranty, her costs will probably
also go up, so she’ll have to raise the price of her product to compensate. And if buyers don’t realize that her warranty is now more generous, they’ll only see the higher price, and will shy away from buying her product. In such a market, the seller will have no incentive
to make this improvement in her warranty. Instead, she’ll continue
to offer the less generous warranty that buyers already expect—thus
turning buyers’ beliefs about the average warranty into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Indeed, we could get even worse results than this. Some other
seller might decide to offer a slightly less generous warranty—and if
consumers know only the average level of warranty in the industry,
they might not realize that this particular seller’s warranty has gotten
worse. Moreover, since this seller will be able to reduce her costs by
offering a stingier warranty, she’ll now be able to reduce her price. If
buyers see only the lower price, and do not see the less generous
warranty, this seller’s sales should increase. In the extreme case, other
sellers will be forced by competition to follow her example and we’ll
have a ‘race to the bottom,’ at the end of which all sellers will be offering stingy warranties. This is what George Akerlof has called the
‘market for lemons’: in the end, only lemons are left on the market.15 Once again, consumers’ information may be perfectly accurate after this end-state is reached—that is, consumers may soon become perfectly aware that every seller offers a stingy warranty, so
they may continue to have accurate beliefs about all existing warranties. The problem is that, under these assumptions, consumers
would not be perfectly aware if any seller were to change her warranty, so the market will never get out of this equilibrium.
Now, having sketched out the theory behind this story I should
mention that there are several factors which in practice may prevent
the result from being so bad. For one thing, consumers don’t always
buy from whichever seller charges the lowest price. In some markets
15

George A. Akerlof, The market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism,  Q.J. Econ.  ().
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a low price may be a signal that the seller is probably cutting corners
somewhere, maybe by offering a stingy warranty. Another check
comes from the fact that a seller who offers a better warranty may be
able to advertise that fact, thus bringing the better warranty to
buyers’ attention.16 (The occasional outbreaks of warranty advertising in the automobile industry show that this is not impossible.) A
third possible check comes from the fact that a seller who offers less
generous terms will have more disappointed customers than a seller
who offers more generous terms. If these disappointed customers repeat their stories often enough to other potential buyers—and if
enough buyers remember the particular seller associated with this
story—sellers who reduce their warranty coverage may suffer the
reputational loss they deserve.
Still, I also have to mention that these countervailing factors
may not work perfectly in every market. Sellers’ advertising claims
may not always be believed by buyers, or it may simply be too expensive for sellers to convey the level of detail needed to inform buyers
correctly. Reputations may not work perfectly, either: in some industries, the repeat business of buyers may not be important, or it
may be too hard for buyers to remember which sellers were associated with good experiences and which were associated with bad
ones. In short, the possibility that inefficient terms might persist because of imperfections in buyers’ information cannot be ruled out
purely as a matter of theory. And if this last theory I’ve been discussing is sound, imperfections in buyers’ information can’t be ruled
out even if, in equilibrium, buyers are perfectly informed about all
the warranties actually offered by sellers.
. Imperfect seller information
Finally, let me also mention that it’s possible to get inefficient
contract terms if buyers are perfectly informed and sellers are the ones
who lack information. This is most likely to be a problem when
different buyers bring different degrees of risk to the transaction,
and sellers don’t know how risky any particular buyer is. In technical
terms, buyers may have an incentive to agree to certain contract
16 See Ronald H. Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A
Comment,  J. Law & Econ.  ().



C W P  L  E

clauses to signal their level of risk, even if the clause is inefficient in
the sense that its total benefits are less than its total costs.17
For example, suppose that some credit buyers (the good credit
risks) have a very low probability of defaulting on their loans, while
other buyers (the bad risks) are six times as likely to default. Suppose,
though, that sellers can’t tell which buyers are good risks and which
ones are bad risks. Sellers can, of course, get a lot of information by
looking at buyers’ credit records and employment histories.
However, within any group of buyers with similar credit records and
employment histories, there will always be some unobservable factors
that make some of these buyers relatively good risks and others relatively bad risks. These differences in risk that remain, after sellers
have done whatever screening they can, are the differences I want to
focus on here.
To make the example more concrete, suppose that if sellers could
find out who the good-risk buyers are, they would be willing to loan
to those buyers at a % interest rate, while they would only be
willing to loan to the bad-risk buyers at an interest rate of %. That
is, a % interest rate would cover the sellers’ expected losses to the
good-risk group of buyers, but a % interest rate would be necessary
to cover the higher expected losses to the bad-risk buyers. But if
sellers don’t know which buyers are which, they won’t be able to
charge one group of buyers % and the other group %. Instead,
they’ll have to charge a rate that’s somewhere in between, to cover
their expected losses from both groups of buyers. For example, if
there are an equal number of good-risk and bad-risk buyers, sellers
might have to charge an interest rate of  % to cover their expected
losses from both groups.
Now let’s introduce a potentially inefficient contract term.
Specifically, consider a clause in which buyers agree to let the seller
17 For technical economic models, see Janusz Ordover & Andrew Weiss,
Information and the Law: Evaluating Legal Restrictions on Competitive
Contracts,  Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proceedings , - (); Samuel
A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit, and Personal Bankruptcy, 
Econ. Inquiry  (); Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal
Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency,  J. Law, Econ.,
& Org.  (). A more accessible explanation can be found in Douglas G .
Baird, Robert H. Gernter & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law
- ().
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repossess all their furniture if they default on their loan. Since I
want to set the example up so that the clause is inefficient, let’s assume that the threat of losing their furniture has no effect on the
likelihood that buyers of either type will repay their loan. (Maybe the
probability of being able to repay depends on events that are entirely
beyond the buyer’s control.) In fact, let’s assume that the threat of
repossession has no effect on anyone’s behavior: all it does is transfer
assets from the buyers to the seller. Finally, let’s assume that this
transfer creates a net loss, thus making the repossession clause inefficient overall. (The net loss might be because the used furniture is
worth more to the buyers that it is to the seller, or it might just be
because of the transaction costs associated with repossession.) These
assumptions may be unrealistic—but I already told you that I was
cooking the example to make sure repossession is inefficient.
I now have to make the example both more concrete and also a
little more complicated. Let’s quantify the inefficiencies associated
with repossession by saying that the right to repossess reduces the
interest rate sellers can charge by one percentage point, because it reduces the seller’s losses if the buyer doesn’t repay. That is, if sellers
have a repossession clause in their contracts, they can afford to loan
to all buyers at an interest rate of %, rather than the % rate they’d
have to charge without the repossession clause. (If sellers could tell
the two groups of buyers apart, they could loan at rates of % and
%, rather than the % and % they have to charge without the
right to repossess.18)
Suppose, though, that a repossession clause inflicts expected costs
on the buyers which are equivalent to more than one percentage
point in the interest rate. (This is what makes the repossession
clause inefficient.) Specifically, suppose that the expected cost of the
repossession clause to low-risk buyers is equivalent to two percentage
points of interest, while the expected cost of the repossession clause
to high-risk buyers is the equivalent of twelve percentage points of
18

In a more realistic example, the repossession clause might reduce the
interest rate sellers charged the high-risk buyers by more than it would reduce
the interest rate they could charge the low-risk buyers, as the repossession
clause would be more likely to come into play against the high-risk buyers
(who, by definition, are more likely to default). Introducing this refinement,
though, would merely make the example more complex without changing the
basic point.
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interest. The expected cost is greater to high-risk buyers because
they’re the ones that are most likely to default, and thus most likely
to have their furniture repossessed. But as I’ve set up the numbers,
the repossession clause is actually inefficient for both groups of
buyers. In each case, the expected cost to the buyers exceeds the expected savings the clause yields for sellers.
Now we come to the potential for market failure. Even if the
repossession clause is inefficient for both groups of buyers, the lowrisk buyers may nonetheless find that it pays to agree to this clause,
in spite of the clause’s inefficiency. Here’s why. No high-risk buyer
would ever agree to this clause, because the expected cost to a highrisk buyer (the equivalent of twelve percentage points of interest) is
far too high. But this means that any buyer who does agree to the
repossession clause must be a low-risk buyer. If sellers are smart
enough to figure this out, that means they can lend to anybody
who’s willing to agree to a repossession clause at the low-risk buyer
rate (%). And if low-risk buyers can get credit at % by agreeing to
a repossession clause, that’s a better deal than refusing to agree to the
repossession clause and having to pay 15%. (If the low-risk buyers
don’t agree to the repossession clause, the seller won’t have any way
of telling them from the high-risk buyers, and she’ll have to charge
them all %).
Meanwhile, once the low-risk buyers all agree to the repossession clause, sellers will then be able to figure out that anybody who
refuses to agree to that clause is a high-risk borrower. Consequently,
sellers will charge anybody who doesn’t agree to the repossession
clause the interest rate appropriate to high-risk buyers: %. Highrisk buyers cannot do better by agreeing to the repossession clause
and paying a nominal rate of %, since (as noted above) the clause
inflicts expected costs on high-risk buyers equal to an additional
twelve percentage points, which more than wipes out the reduction
in the nominal interest rate. In the end, therefore, all high-risk
buyers will pay a % rate and will not be subject to a repossession
clause; while all low-risk buyers will pay a % nominal rate but will
agree to a repossession clause, thus paying an effective rate equal to
%. (The two contracts offered and accepted in equilibrium are
shown in bold in Table I.)
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Without repossession
clause
With repossession
clause

Low-risk
Buyers
%

High-risk
Buyers
 %

All Buyers
(pooled)
%

%
(%+%)

%
(%+%)

—

: The repossession clause yields a  % benefit to sellers, but has an expected cost equal to  % for low-risk buyers and % for high-risk buyers.

In this example, then, the low-risk buyers agree to the repossession clause as a way of distinguishing themselves from the high-risk
buyers. By distinguishing themselves from the high-risk buyers, the
low-risk buyers get an interest rate six points lower than the % rate
they would have to pay if all buyers refused to agree to the clause.
This six-point savings is more than enough to offset the expected
costs these low-risk buyers suffer as a result of the clause. But this
savings to the low-risk buyers is mostly a transfer from the high-risk
buyers, who are now going to have to pay an interest rate of %
(rather than the % rate that they, too, would pay if all buyers refused to agree to the clause). The ‘market failure’ involved here is
thus a form of externality, in which low-risk buyers are able to shift
some costs to the high-risk buyers by agreeing to a clause which sig
nals their low level of risk. The overall effect, though, is a loss in efficiency. The gains to the low-risk buyers and the losses to the highrisk buyers cancel out, and the only thing left is the cost imposed by
the repossession clause itself.19
19

In mathematical terms, the equilibrium involves the high-risk buyers
paying an interest rate of % (with no repossession clause) and the low-risk
buyers paying an effective rate of % (with a repossession clause). The average
rate paid by all buyers is thus (% + %) ÷ , or .%. This is .% higher
than the % rate that all buyers would pay (with a repossession clause) if the
repossession clause were banned, and sellers could no longer distinguish
between high-risk and low-risk buyers. The .% average loss comes from the
fact that the clause inflicts a % deadweight loss on all loans to low-risk buyers,
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At this point, let me repeat that I’ve cooked the numbers to
make the example come out this way. It’s just as easy to come up
with variations on these numbers in which a repossession clause
would be efficient. For example, in some cases it might not be efficient for sellers to loan to high-risk buyers, and a repossession clause
might then be an effective way of preventing this inefficient result.
In other cases, low-risk buyers might not be willing to borrow if
they have to pay a % interest rate, in which case the only way those
loans would ever take place is if low-risk buyers can distinguish
themselves by agreeing to a repossession clause. In still other cases,
the repossession clause might be efficient for all buyers—for example, if the threat of repossession creates more efficient incentives for
buyers to take precautions against accidents that might leave them
unable to repay.
In short, all I’ve shown so far is that it’s possible for imperfect
information to cause inefficient contract terms to persist in competitive markets. For this to justify the legal regulations of contract
terms, we have to look at how effective the regulation will be at preventing these inefficiencies without creating new ones. In other
words—and I promise this will be the last topic—we now have to
turn to the question of legal remedies.
III. R
One remedy that I’m not going to address attempts to solve the
information problem directly, by mandating the disclosure of information. This kind of remedy will not always be workable, for disclosure itself has costs, and sometimes there may be no information
that could usefully (or practicably) be disclosed. In the highrisk/low-risk buyer example, for instance, it is hard to think of any
specific piece of information that buyers could possibly disclose. Still,
in any case in which disclosure can be used to restore the market to
something close to the perfect information that I described earlier, a
disclosure remedy is certainly worth considering. If disclosure rules
could recreate the perfect market described earlier, it would then be
who make up exactly half of the population in this example. (The % deadweight loss on loans to low-risk buyers is because the repossession clause inflicts costs on those buyers equal to %, but benefits sellers by only %.)
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unnecessary for courts to try to decide which contract terms were
inefficient.20
My focus here, though, is on direct restrictions on freedom of
contract, in the form of bans on the enforcement of certain contractual terms. I showed earlier that there could be cases where the
market could generate inefficient terms. The problem I want to
point to now is that, even if we’re certain that the market is working
inefficiently, we still may not know which terms we ought to ban.
This is easiest to see in the high-risk/low-risk example I just described. In my example, the repossession clause was in fact inefficient—but I also pointed out that, if the example were changed
slightly, the repossession clause might well be efficient. The problem
that a court or legislature is going to face is that it won’t know for
sure which theoretical model best describes any particular real-world
contract. This problem introduces another risk: the risk that the legal system, in attempting to increase the efficiency of markets, may
make a mistake and end up reducing efficiency.
The same problem comes up in my first two examples, stories,
where buyers were the ones who were imperfectly informed about
sellers’ contract terms. Even when buyers know nothing at all about
the contracts they sign, it hardly follows that every term ought to be
prohibited, for if every term were prohibited then no enforceable
contract could ever be singed. Instead, even in such an extreme case
of imperfect information, courts still have to be able to tell whether
any given clause produces net efficiency benefits or net efficiency
losses. You can think of this as the economic analog of the legal distinction between procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.21 Even if we’re sure there’s something wrong with
the market processes that generated the contract terms—the economic equivalent of procedural unconscionability—we also have to
20 For more extended discussions of the costs and benefits of information
disclosure, see Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note ; Alan Schwartz &
Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis,  U. Pa. L. Rev.  ().
21 The legal distinction is due to Arthur Alan Leff, Unconscionability
and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause,  U. Pa. L. Rev. ,  ().
For more on an economic interpretation of this distinction, see Richard
Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines,  U. Chi. L. Rev. , - ().



C W P  L  E

be sure the clause is substantively undesirable before it makes sense to
ban the clause.22
In other words, even when we are quite sure that the market is
not working perfectly, the market can be improved upon only if a
court or legislature can ban the inefficient terms without also banning the efficient ones. This requires the court to be able to determine whether any given clause is inefficient or not. But a direct
analysis of the efficiency of any given clause will often be very difficult, and courts (or other legal institutions) may not be very good at
this task.
Think about it this way: most challenged contract terms produce
both good and bad effects. For example, a term limiting a manufacturer’s liability under a product warranty might, on the one hand,
reduce the manufacturer’s incentive to produce a reliable product.
This effect, taken by itself, would probably be a bad one (in efficiency terms), since it could lead to an inefficiently low level of
product reliability. On the other hand, the same term might increase
the customer’s incentive to use the product more carefully, This effect, taken by itself, would probably be a good one in efficiency
terms. On the third hand—for those of you who have three
hands—the same term would also reduce the extent of customers’
insurance, by limiting the compensation they would receive if the
product was defective. This effect could be either good or bad, depending on the degree of consumers’ risk-aversion.23
Now, there’s a lot more that could be said about each of these
three effects, as well as other effects that I haven’t even mentioned.
However, this is enough to give you a general idea of the kind of
things that a court would have to consider in any direct evaluation of
the efficiency or inefficiency of a challenged term. Moreover, the
court would also need some way to estimate the approximate size of
22 A ban on the enforcement of even efficient terms could be justified as a
kind of penalty against sellers who fail to comply with a mandatory disclosure
program of the sort described at the beginning of this section (see text supra at
note ). However, this makes sense only when disclosure is both feasible and
desirable. For a further discussion of this possibility, see Craswell, supra note
, at -.
23 Risk-aversion, in this context, is just economic jargon for, ‘depending
on whether consumers want insurance strongly enough to be willing to pay for
it.’
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the good and bad effects, to figure out whether the net effect was
good or bad. But measuring the actual size of any of these effects
will usually be extremely difficult, at least at the present state of our
knowledge. While there’s been a great deal of theoretical work
identifying the effects that might be present in any given case,
there’s been much less empirical work aimed at measuring the exact
size of those effects. Moreover, the size of the effects will probably
vary from market to market or from industry to industry, so empirical studies of the size of the effects in one kind of contract may not
tell us much about the size of the effects in other contracts. This
could make it difficult for even a trained analyst to decide whether
any particular contract term is inefficient or not. And if we’re
imagining a legal test in which courts (and not trained analysts)
would have to figure out whether a contract term is inefficient, the
problems become even greater.
In short, the appropriate comparison here (as in so many other
areas) is not between an imperfect market and a perfectly functioning legal system. Instead, the relevant comparison is between an
admittedly imperfect market, on the one hand; and an admittedly
imperfect legal system, on the other. Moreover, the imperfections of
each institution are likely to vary significantly from case to case, or
from industry to industry. In some industries, buyers may be quite
well-informed and the market may work very well; in others the industries, market imperfections may be much more serious.
Presumably, the same is true of the imperfections of the legal system—though these imperfections are, at present, much less understood.
What this means is that we have a good deal more to learn about
the potential inefficiencies of markets, on the one hand, and the
potential inefficiencies of governmental efforts to improve those
markets, on the other. I realize that it may be a bit self-serving for
an academic professor to conclude ‘further research is needed,’ but I
think that’s the only conclusion possible here. We’ve certainly come
a long way in our understanding of the economic effects of limits on
contract terms—but we’ve also got a long way to go.
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IV. C
To some of you, it might seem odd that I’ve devoted most of a
Coase Lecture to talking about market failures. There’s a popular
impression that economists in general, and maybe University of
Chicago economists in particular, spend most of their time proving
that markets do not fail. I want to close, though, by suggesting that
the comparative analysis I’ve just highlighted is actually in the best
Chicago tradition, if that tradition is properly understood. Indeed,
this sort of comparative analysis is similar in many ways to the comparison called for in Ronald Coase’s pathbreaking  article, ‘The
Nature of the Firm.’24
Coase’s article did not begin by assuming that prices and markets
always worked perfectly. Instead, he pointed out that many economic activities—specifically, the production and allocation decisions that take place within a firm—have deliberately been removed
from the workings of ordinary markets and subjected instead to a
sort of hierarchical or command-control ordering system. For example, factory managers don’t normally put each day’s jobs out to bid
to the different members of the factory’s work force, or require their
workers to buy each day’s supplies from the inventory room at a
market-clearing price. Instead, the question of how many workers
to hire and how many supplies to stock is generally decided centrally
by the factory’s management. The allocation of those workers and
supplies on a day-to-day basis also is usually left to centralized planning within the factory.
For Coase, the question was what explained the existence of
these ‘islands’ of centralized planning within an otherwise market
economy. His insight was to realize that this question could not be
answered from a theoretical framework which assumed that markets
always worked perfectly. Instead, the way to answer a question like
this was (a) to recognize that markets generally entail frictions or
costs; (b) to recognize that the alternatives to markets (in this case,
hierarchical allocation systems) also have costs; and (c) to begin the
inquiry into the exact nature and extent of those costs, in order to
figure out where and when each regime would minimize the total
costs. (Of course, Coase’s insistence on the importance of transac24

Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,  Economica  ().
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tion costs was also to lead to his ‘Coase Theorem’ article,25 and
eventually to a Nobel prize in economics.)
In short, one of Coase’s insights was that both markets and their
alternatives have imperfections, and that the most interesting questions concern the nature and degree of the imperfections of each. I
believe that this same insight must drive any inquiries into the efficiency of restrictions on freedom of contract. If one starts with the
premise that markets are always efficient, the inquiry will be over as
soon as it is begun, and any analysis of the comparative efficiency or
inefficiency of judicial and regulatory regimes will never get off the
ground. If we instead recognize that markets may not always work
perfectly, and we also recognize that this conclusion is not itself sufficient to justify the legal regulation of contract terms, we can then
proceed to the questions that are really worth studying.

Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost,’  J. Law & Econ. 
(). (The phrase, ‘Coase Theorem’ —never mentioned in the article
itself—was coined by later scholars.)
Coase’s insights into the nature of the firm have since become the basis for
an entire branch of industrial organization economics. For citations to this literature see, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of
the Firm,  Colum. L. Rev.  (); Conference Issue, Contracts and the
Activities of Firms,  J. Law & Econ.  (); Oliver E. Williamson,
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications ().
25
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